Professional Documents
Culture Documents
September 2010
Contact details
Greenpeace EU Unit
Jan Haverkamp
Email: jan.haverkamp@greenpeace.org
GeneWatch UK
60 Lightwood Road, Buxton, Derbyshire SK17 7BB
Phone: 01298 24300
Email: mail@genewatch.org Website: www.genewatch.org
GeneWatch
Registered in England and Wales Company Number 3556885
UK
Cover
The cover photograph by Eric Shmuttenmaer is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Share Alike 2.0 Generic license. The world's first nuclear reactor was rebuilt at this site in Red Gate
Woods near Chicago in 1943 after initial operation at the University of Chicago.
List of figures
Figure 1: Decay in radiotoxicity of spent nuclear fuel ..................................................16
This report examines the current state of scientific evidence regarding the geological disposal of
spent nuclear fuel and other high-level and long-lived radioactive wastes.
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which was founded in 1957 to promote the use
of nuclear power in Europe, has been financing research in the area of geological disposal of high-
level radioactive waste for more than three decades and has provided considerable support to
1
national research and development programmes.
Worldwide, thirteen countries are actively pursuing long-term waste management programmes for
high-level radioactive wastes resulting from nuclear electricity generation, but no country has yet
2
completed an operational geological disposal facility for such wastes.
The 2009 Euratom-funded Vision Document of the European Implementing Geological Disposal of
Radioactive Waste Technology Platform (IGD-TP) states that “a growing consensus exists” that deep
disposal is the most appropriate solution to disposing of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste and
other long-lived radioactive wastes, and that it is time to proceed to licensing the construction and
operation of deep geological repositories for radioactive waste disposal.3 This conclusion is
supported by the 2009 report of the European Commission’s (EC’s) Joint Research Centre (JRC),
which states that “our scientific understanding of the processes relevant for geological disposal has
developed well enough to proceed with step-wise implementation”.4
The IGD-TP Vision Document has been prepared by an Interim Executive Group with members from
the nuclear waste management organisations SKB (Sweden), Posiva (Finland) and Andra (France)
and the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi). It adopts the vision that by
2025 the first geological disposal facilities for spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste and other long-
lived radioactive waste will be operating safely in Europe. The Director of Energy (Euratom) for the
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research states in the Foreword:
These will not only be the first such facilities in Europe but also the first in the world. I am
convinced that through this initiative, safe and responsible practices for the long-term
management of hazardous radioactive waste can be disseminated to other Member States
and even 3rd countries, thereby ensuring the greatest possible protection of all citizens and
5
the environment both now and in the future.
The IGD-TP states that inherent in “all the successful outcomes to date in European nuclear waste
management programmes” are judgements that safe geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-
level waste, and other long-lived radioactive waste is achievable: “In this context, the future RD&D
[Research, Development and Demonstration] issues to be pursued, including their associated
uncertainties, are not judged to bring the feasibility of disposal into question.” This statement reflects
the view expressed by the Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC) of the OECD’s
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)6 that “geological disposal is technically feasible” and that a “geological
disposal system provides a unique level and duration of protection for high activity, long-lived
radioactive waste”.
However, the OECD/NEA position is merely a collective statement, based on the views of the
RWMC, not an analysis of the existing scientific evidence. Similarly, the IGD-TP report relies on a
road map towards radioactive waste management developed by the European Nuclear Energy
Forum7, and includes no references to papers in scientific journals. The EC’s JRC report is largely a
description of ongoing research projects; it cites only three papers published in academic journals
(one of which dates from 1999) plus lists of background reports, largely published by the NEA and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a few conference papers. The report makes no
obvious links between these summaries of research activity and its conclusion that Europe is ready
to proceed to implementation of deep geological disposal.8 In a rare example of a referenced claim,
the JRC’s statement that corrosion of steel (and the generation of hydrogen gas by this process) will
not compromise the safety of a repository is based solely on an unpublished note of a panel
discussion held in Brussels in 2007. Further, the report falsely claims that repository programmes in
9
Nuclear reactors are used to generate electricity in 31 countries in the world. Currently, there are
438 operational nuclear power plants in the world, with a total net installed capacity of 372.038
GW(e).10
The IAEA lists 61 nuclear power reactors as currently under construction, mainly in China, Russia,
11
South Korea and India. In Europe, new reactors are being built at Olkiluoto in Finland, Flamanville
in France and Mochovce in the Slovak Republic. Globally, China is expected to be the fourth largest
12
generator of nuclear power by 2025, behind the USA, France and Japan.
Nuclear electricity generation creates large quantities of radioactive wastes, not only in nuclear
power plants themselves, but at all stages of the nuclear chain, from uranium mining to
decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The most highly radioactive wastes are those which are
produced in the core of the reactor. The focus of this report is on spent nuclear fuel: this is nuclear
fuel that has been involved in the nuclear chain reaction at the heart of the reactor (see Box 1).
Some countries intend to dispose of spent nuclear fuel directly, but in other countries it is first
reprocessed (Box 2). Reprocessing changes the characteristics of the wastes that will ultimately be
sent to a repository.
The amount of radioactive waste produced in a reactor depends on the reactor type. On the basis of
data from 1992, the IAEA estimates that one year’s operation of a Light Water Reactor (LWR)
producing 1GW of power typically results in spent fuel assemblies containing a total of 30 to 50
metric tonnes of heavy metal , with an initial activity of around 5 to 8.3 million TBq of radioactivity.13
According to the IAEA, current reprocessing procedures would separate about 15m3 of vitrified high-
level radioactive waste from this quantity of spent fuel. These figures are indicative only and have
changed significantly with time. More modern reactors using higher burn-up fuel will produce smaller
quantities of spent fuel but with higher levels of radioactivity per fuel rod. These changes can have
14
significant implications for the safety case for a repository.
In total, over 10,000 metric tonnes of spent nuclear fuel are being produced globally each year. The
global inventory of spent nuclear fuel is expected to more than double to over 445,000 metric tonnes
26
by 2020, with the highest percentage increases in developing countries. Yet, to date, no country has
27
achieved an effective solution for the long-term management of spent nuclear fuel.
Box 3: Radioactivity
The basic constituents of radioactive wastes are called radionuclides. These are atoms which
are unstable and change to other more stable forms in a process known as radioactive decay,
until a stable form is reached. The unit of radioactivity is the becquerel (Bq), defined as one
decay per second. The half-life is a measure of how quickly a particular radionuclide decays: it
is the time taken for the radioactivity to decay to half of its initial value. Different radionuclides
have different half-lives, varying from fractions of a second to millions of years.32
After the decay of a radionuclide atom, the remaining nucleus can be either stable (i.e. non-
radioactive) or unstable. If it is unstable, it will decay again: for some radionuclides long chains
of decays result as one atom changes to another and then another, emitting radiation at each
step.
When a radionuclide decays it can emit alpha, beta or gamma radiation.
Alpha radiation consists of two protons and two neutrons bonded together in a particle that is
High-level radioactive wastes are so radioactive that the decay process generates significant
amounts of heat. They contain a wide variety of radionuclides, each with different physical and
chemical properties. Each radionuclide decays differently and has a different half-life. The physics of
radioactive decay is well understood, but the inventory of radionuclides in the wastes is not well
known. In addition, the chemistry of how wastes will behave in a repository is very complicated,
because each element can take different forms and form a variety of compounds: some of these
chemicals may dissolve easily and leak out of the repository in groundwater, while others may attach
to the backfill or the surrounding rock and thus be contained more easily. Some can also
Figure 1 shows how the radiotoxicity of spent fuel decays with time, on the basis of published
calculations for spent fuel from an LWR with a burn-up of 33 GWd per tonne of heavy metal, initial
enrichment 3.2% of uranium-235, and five years’ cooling.38 The radionuclide content and hence the
decay curve will differ for higher burn-up spent fuels and those from different reactor types.
Research on nuclear waste disposal began in the1950s but a concerted attempt to solve the problem
did not begin until the late 1970s.
In 1976 the influential Flowers Report, published by the UK Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution, concluded that “There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission
power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the
40
safe containment of long-lived radioactive waste for the indefinite future.” In April 1977, the Swedish
Parliament passed the groundbreaking Nuclear Stipulation Act (Villkorslagen) that reinforced this
standpoint by requiring the operators of nuclear power plants to have “proven how and where a
completely safe final storage facility” could be constructed for spent nuclear fuel or reprocessed high-
level waste before operating permission was granted. In the USA, the Interagency Review Group on
Nuclear Waste Management called for the development of geological repositories for high-level
41
nuclear waste disposal in 1979.
Since the adoption of these policies in the late 1970s, the focus of high-level nuclear waste disposal
has been on burying wastes underground. Other options – such as firing the waste into space in
rockets, burying it under the Antarctic ice sheet or dumping at sea – have been progressively ruled
out as unfeasible and/or unsafe. As a result deep geological disposal has dominated research
42
priorities for over 30 years.
The option of deep geological disposal would involve excavating a repository in rock, hundreds of
metres underground. The radioactive waste would then be put in containers which would in turn be
placed in deposition holes in tunnels in the rock. Tunnels would be backfilled to keep the containers
in place and to slow the release of radionuclides from the waste once the containers had corroded.
The site is supposed to be chosen so that the flow of water through the waste and back to the
surface would be slow enough for the radioactivity to decrease significantly before the living
environment above the repository could become contaminated. The release of gas from corroding
canisters and other structures, and radioactive gas from the waste itself, also needs to be
considered, as does the risk of future earthquakes or glaciation affecting the repository. The geology
of the chosen site and the engineered barriers around the waste are intended to be passively safe
(i.e. not to require human intervention) after the closure of drifts and shafts. However, some designs
would also allow retrieval of wastes should future generations decide to undertake this. The
geological disposal concept involves multiple barriers in an attempt to ensure the long-term
protection of the living environment.
The key stages for implementation of geological disposal are:
l establishment of the waste inventory
l development of concepts and technologies
l site selection and characterisation
l design of the deep geological repository
l safety demonstration based on scientific knowledge and demonstration of technology
l licensing
l construction and manufacturing
l waste emplacement
l backfilling and sealing
l final closure.
Siting a repository may take several decades and construction is expected to take another decade.
Final closure is expected to be at least several decades more after the start of the operational phase.
As well as the repository itself, encapsulation facilities would also be needed: here spent fuel or the
vitrified waste from reprocessing would be placed in canisters or overpacks. Long-lived intermediate-
level waste is often encapsulated in concrete or bitumen and may be placed in steel barrels.
Currently active programmes are mainly limited to two different approaches: the first developed by
the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), and the second largely by the
French nuclear waste management company ANDRA. The Swedish approach involves the disposal
of spent nuclear fuel in copper canisters in crystalline rock (Box 7). The French approach involves the
disposal of vitrified high-level waste in steel overpacks in clay rock formations (Box 8).
Finland and Sweden plan to start operating deep geological repositories for direct disposal of spent
nuclear fuel in 2020 and 2023 respectively, following the Swedish deep repository concept. Canada
and South Korea intend to follow a similar approach, as does the UK for disposal of unreprocessed
spent nuclear fuel from new nuclear reactors.
France plans to start operating a deep geological repository for vitrified high-level waste from
reprocessing in 2025. Belgium and Switzerland are also investigating a similar approach using clay
host rocks.
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Box 8: The French concept
The French concept for deep disposal differs from the Swedish one in two main respects. Firstly,
the rock type will be clay, not crystalline; secondly, vitrified high-level wastes will be placed in
steel overpacks rather than copper canisters. Steel is expected to corrode more rapidly than
copper, so the safety performance of the repository will be more reliant on the surrounding
bentonite and clay rock.
Russia has been investigating the feasibility of salt, granite, clay and basalt as possible host rocks for
geological repositories, but has no projected date for completion of a repository. China is
investigating five potential repository sites, including a proposed underground research laboratory
site in the Gobi desert, but is not expected to have an operational disposal facility until 2040 at the
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earliest.
In Finland a disposal site has already been selected at Olkiluoto. In Sweden a site has been selected
at Forsmark, on the east coast. In France the zone for disposal – the village of Bure in Lorraine – has
been selected and the final site is to be specified by 2013. The Swedish, Finnish and French
proposals are therefore the main focus of the remainder of this report.
4.1.5. Creep
Creep is the tendency of a solid material slowly to move or deform permanently under the influence
of stresses. Creep in copper occurs readily at the high temperatures expected in a nuclear waste
repository. In safety assessments calculations are necessary to show that the canisters will not
rupture under the stresses to which they will be subjected. Calculations based on a creep model of
the Swedish deep disposal canisters under the pressure and temperature conditions expected in the
repository suggest that there will be very high stresses at the edges of the canisters, where creep
rates will therefore be high, and that the cylindrical canisters will distort to an hour-glass shape in the
repository due to elastic and creep deformation. However, the creep strain at the edges is still
expected to be less than would be needed to rupture the canisters.127
creation of highly alkaline fluids is expected to degrade the clay rock at the interface with the barriers
in the French repository concept, and concrete engineered barriers may also be susceptible to attack
by groundwater containing dissolved sulphates.154
4.7. Earthquakes
Inactive faults may be reactivated during the lifetime of a repository and earthquakes could severely
damage the containment system, including the canisters, backfill and the rock.
Networks of monitoring stations in north-west Europe have identified the positions of seismic events
since the 1970s. In Britain, there are two regional-scale clusters of seismicity, one occupying the
length of onshore western Britain and the southern North Sea, the other in the northern North Sea.
However, this seismicity data only represents a few decades of observations and it could be argued
that this length of historical record is not very relevant to earthquake hazard assessment over periods
of tens of thousands of years. Seismic reflection data indicate that the fault density is as great in the
areas of the UK that have been seismically quiet in the historical period as it is anywhere else; given
the difficulty in declaring a fault extinct, such faults could become seismic hazards during the lifetime
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of a repository.
The Pärvie Fault system in northern Sweden contains faults that have been reactivated since the
Precambrian and which are strong candidates for future movement under suitable stress
conditions.262 In Finland and Sweden, changes in the mass of glacial ice sheets associated with
periodic advances and retreats of ice are associated with very strong earthquakes. It is difficult to
predict the extent to which faults may be reactivated by glaciations.
5.1. Safety assessment: the evidence base, the methodology and its limitations
The literature review set out above suggests that significant releases of radioactivity from a deep
underground repository could occur in a number of ways:
l Copper or steel canisters and overpacks containing spent nuclear fuel or high-level
radioactive wastes could corrode more quickly than expected.
l The effects of intense heat generated by radioactive decay, and of chemical and physical
disturbance due to corrosion, gas generation and biomineralisation, could impair the ability of
backfill material to trap some radionuclides.
l Build-up of gas pressure in the repository, as a result of the corrosion of metals and/or the
degradation of organic material, could damage the barriers and force fast routes for
radionuclide escape through crystalline rock fractures or clay rock pores.
l Poorly understood chemical effects, such as the formation of colloids, could speed up the
transport of some of the more radiotoxic elements such as plutonium.
l Unidentified fractures and faults, or poor understanding of how water and gas will flow through
fractures and faults, could lead to the release of radionuclides in groundwater much faster
than expected.
l Excavation of the repository will damage adjacent zones of rock and could thereby create fast
routes for radionuclide escape.
l Future generations, seeking underground resources or storage facilities, might accidentally
dig a shaft into the rock around the repository or a well into contaminated groundwater above
it.
l Future glaciations could cause faulting of the rock, rupture of containers and penetration of
surface waters or permafrost to the repository depth, leading to failure of the barriers and
faster dissolution of the waste.
l Earthquakes could damage containers, backfill and the rock.
Although computer models of some of these processes have undoubtedly become more
sophisticated, fundamental difficulties remain in predicting the relevant chemical and geochemical
reactions and complex coupled processes (including the effects of heat, mechanical deformation,
microbes and coupled gas and water flow through fractured crystalline rocks or clay) over the long
timescales necessary.
To date, preliminary safety assessments have been produced for the selected sites in Forsmark,
281 282 283
Sweden and Olkiluoto, Finland and the selected region of Bure, France. All these assessments
have been produced by the nuclear waste management organisations SKB (Sweden), Posiva
(Finland) and Andra (France) themselves. Safety assessments have also been produced in the past
for the Yucca Mountain site (now abandoned) and for the failed plan to bury long-lived radioactive
wastes near Sellafield in the UK.284
According to the Finnish nuclear waste disposal company, Posiva, the following issues are still
285
pending final resolution and will be addressed in future updates:
l the initial state of the site (e.g., in situ stresses, the fracture network, hydrogeochemical
conditions at repository depth)
l the impact of the EDZ and thermal spalling on the hydraulic evolution
l the evolution of buffer/backfill saturation (e.g. time to reach full swelling pressure) and its
consequences for the performance of the engineered barrier system
5.3. Costs
The global market for nuclear decommissioning and clean-up is estimated at £300 billion (€360
billion) over the next 30 years.338 The costs of deep geological disposal are significant: for example,
South Korea has estimated the cost of its proposed spent fuel repository as 2.6 billion euros.339
The cost of the copper canisters is one of the key components of the cost of a nuclear waste
repository built according to the Swedish concept. In South Korea, 14,210 canisters will be needed to
dispose of spent fuel consisting of 36,000 tonnes of uranium from the two existing reactor types
(11,375 pressurised water reactor (PWR) canisters and 2,835 CANDU canisters). As part of a cost-
estimation exercise in Korea, the cost of a CANDU canister consisting of a 5cm copper outer shell
with a cast iron insert was calculated at €171,415 and the cost of a PWR copper canister produced
using the cheapest method at €156,776 (2006 prices). In these calculations, the material cost was
about 43% of a canister’s total manufacturing cost (the rest being mainly labour costs), and the
340
manufacturing cost of the canisters represented about 32% of the total disposal costs. South Korea
accordingly plans to use a thinner (1cm rather than 5cm) copper canister to reduce costs;341 however,
this will impact on containment and hence on safety. There is uncertainty regarding the future costs of
both the main materials needed to implement the Swedish deep disposal concept: copper powder for
the canisters and bentonite for the backfill.342
The repository layout will also influence costs due to the cost of constructing and backfilling the
343
tunnels and the costs of the bentonite needed for the disposal holes. For example, placing several
spent fuel canisters in long horizontal disposal drifts is cheaper than excavating individual vertical
disposal holes accessed via tunnels. However, this option is more sensitive to the site geology
344
because a single large fracture zone in a long disposal drift could destroy the whole drift. The
design of a repository in fractured rock may need to be optimised to minimise the number of locations
where water-conducting fractures are intersected.345
Some of the concerns highlighted in the literature review above could be mitigated by changes to the
repository design. However, major changes would have significant impacts on projected costs.