THE DOWNING STREET PAPERS, Transcriptions

Text of the Iraq Options paper - March 8, 2002 Memo from Overseas and Defence
Secretariat

IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER SECRET UK EYES ONLY

SUMMARY

Since 1991, our objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess
WMD or threaten its neighbors, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur
with Saddam Hussein in power. As at least worst opinion, we have supported a policy of
containment which has been partially successful. However:

* Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD,. although our intelligence is poor. Saddam
has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though there is
no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will use WMD; and
* Saddam’s brutal regime remains in power and destablises the Arab and wider Islamic world.

We have two options. We could toughen the existing containment policy. This would increase
the pressure on Saddanm [sic]. It would not reintegrate Iraq into the international community.

The US administration has lot faith in containment and is now considering regime change. The
end states could either be a Sunni strongman or a representative government.

Tre [sic] three options for achieving regime change are:

* covert support to opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup;

* air support for opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup; and
* a full-scale ground campaign.

These are not mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option3
[sic]. the greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the
greater the cost and the longer we woul [sic] need to stay. the only certain means to remove
Saddam and his elite is to invade and impose a new government. But this could involve nation
building over many years. Even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and
build-up its conventional forces, so long a Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional
armouries and there was no acceptable solution to Palestinian grievances.

A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, non currently
exists. This makes moving quickly to invade legally very difficult. We should therefore consider
a staged approach, establishing international support, building up pressure on Saddam and
developing military plans. There is a lead time of about 6 months to a ground offensive.

CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF UK POLICY

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1 Within our objectives of preserving peace and stability in the Gulf and ensuring energy
security, our current objectives towards Iraq are:
* the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbours,
into the international community. Implicitly this cannot occur with Saddam in power; and
* hence, as the least worst option, we have supported containment of Iraq, by constraining
Saddam’s ability to re-arm or build up WMD and to threaten his neighbours.

2 Subsidiary objectives are:

* Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq;
* improving the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people;
* protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq;
*sustaining UK/UK co-operation, including, if necessary by moderating US policy; and
* maintaining the credibility and authority of the Security Council.

HAS CONTAINMENT WORKED?

3 Since 1991, the policy of containment has been partially successful;

* Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme;
* Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels;
* ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted;
Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been hindered;
* No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some protection to the
Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds remain
autonomous; and
* Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.

4 However:
* Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, although our intelligence is poor. Iraq
has up to 20 650km-range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting
Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit os 150km
continues. Iraq continues with the BW and CW programmed and, if it has not already done so
could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a
decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including is ballistic
missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam
has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.
* Saddam leads a brutal regime, which impoverishes his people. While in power Saddam is a
rallying point for anti-Western sentiment in the Arab and wider Islamic world, and as such a
cause of instability; and
* despite UN controls over Iraq’s oil revenue under Oil for Food, there is considerable oil and
other smuggling.

5 In this context, and against the background of our desire to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq
into the international community, we examine the two following policy options:
* a toughening of the existing containment policy, facilitate by 11 September; and
* regime change by military means: a new departure which would require the construction of a
coalition and a legal justification.

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TOUGHENING CONTAINMENT

6 This would consist of the following elements:

* full implementation of all relevant UNSCRs, particularly 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). We
should ensure that the Good Review List (GRL) is introduced in May and that Russian holds to its
promise not to block. The signs are positive but continuing pressure is needed. (The GRL focuses
sanctions exclusively on preventing shipments of WMD-related and other arms, while allowing
other business without scrutiny. As such, it will greatly facilitate legitimate Iraqi commerce under
Oil for Food.);
* encourage the US not to block discussions to clarify the modalities of Resolution 1284 once
Russian agreement to the GRL has been secured. We should take a hard-line on each area for
clarification - the purpose of clarification is not to lower the bar on Iraqi compliance; but
* P5 and Security Council unity would facilitate a specific demand that Iraq re-admit the UN
inspectors. Our aim would be to tell Saddam to admit inspectors or face the risk of military action.
* push for tougher action (especially by the US) against states breaking sanctions. This should not
discriminate between allies (Turkey), friends (UAE) and others (especially Syria). It would put
real pressure on Saddam either to submit to meaningful inspections or to lash out;
* maintain our present military posture, including in the NFZs, and be prepared to respond
robustly to any Iraqi adventurism; and
* continue to make clear (without overtly espousing regime change) our view that Iraq would be
better off without Saddam. We could trail the rosy future for Iraq without him in a ‘Con tract with
the Iraqi People’, although to be at all credible, this would need some detailed work.

7 What could it achieve:

* There will be greater pressure on Saddam. The GRL will make sanctions more attractive to at
least some of their detractors. Improving implementation of sanctions would reduce the regime’s
illicit revenues; and
* the return of UN weapons inspectors would allow greater scrutiny of Iraqi programmes and of
Iraqi forces in general. If they found significant evidence of WMD, were expelled or, in face of
an ultimatum, not re-admitted in the first place, then this could provide legal justification for
large-scale military action (see below).

8 But:
* Some of the difficulties with the existing policy still apply;
those states in breach of sanctions will want compensation if they are to change ge tack;
* Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he believes the threat of large scale
US military action is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US from acting
decisively. Playing for time, he would then embark on a renewed policy of non co-operation; and
* although containment has held for the past decade, Iraq has progressively increased it
international engagement. Even if the GRL makes sanctions more sustainable the sanctions
regime could collapse in the long-term.

9 Tougher containment would not re-integrate Iraq into the international community as it
offers little prospect of removing Saddam. He will continue with his WMD programmes,
destabilising the ARab and Islamic world, and impoverishing his people. But there is no greater

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threat no that he will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is
an option.

US VIEWS

10 The US has lost confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed.
The success of Operation Enduring Freedom, distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes,
and unfinished business from 1991 are all factors. Washington believes the legal basis for an
attack on Iraq already exists. Nor will it necessarily be governed by wider political factors. The
US may be willing to work with a much smaller coalition than we think desirable.

REGIME CHANGE

11 In considering the options for regime change below, we need to first consider what sort of
Iraq we want? There are two possibilities:
* A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity.
Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on
abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights, particularly of ethnic minorities.
The US and other militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then be a strong risk
of the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic, Sunni
dictator emerged who protected Sunni interests. With time he could acquire WMD; or
* a representative broadly democratic government. This would be Sunni-led but within a federal
structure, the Kurds would be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to government. Such
a regime would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive
it would require the US and others to commit to nation building for many years. This wold entail
a substantial international security force and help with reconstruction

OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER: INTERNAL

12 Saddam has a strong grip on power maintained through fear and patronage. The security and
intelligence apparatus, including the Republican and Special Republican Guard, who protect the
regime to effectively are predominantly drawn from the Arab Sunni minority (2-25 per cent of the
population); many from Tikrit like Saddam. They fear non-Sunni rule, which would bring retribution
and the end of their privileges. The regime’s success in defeating the 1991 uprising stemmed from
senior Sunni officers looking into the abyss of Shia rule and preserving their interests by backing
Saddam. In the current circumstances, a military revolt or coup is a remote possibility.

13 Unaided, the Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime. The external
opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic credibility. The predominant group is the Iraqi
National Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation led by Ahmad Chalabi, a Shia and convicted
fraudster, popular on Capitol Hill. The other major group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), espouses
moderate Arab socialism and is led by another Shia, Ayad Allawi. Neither group has a military
capability and both are badly penetrated by Iraqi intelligence. In 1996, a CIA attempt to stir
opposition groups ended in wholesale executions. Most Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western stooges.

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14 The internal opposition is small and fractured on ethnic and sectarian grounds. There is
no effective Sunni Arab opposition. There are 3-4m in northern Iraq. Most live in Kurdish
Autonomous Zone, established in 1991. The Kurds deploy at least 40,000 lightly armed militia
but are divided between two main parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These groups have an interest in preserving the status quo
and are more interested in seeking advantage over the other than allying against Saddam. Divide
and rule is easy; in 196 the KDP assisted the Iraqi Army’s expulsion of the PUK and Iraqi
opposition groups from Irbil.

15 The Kurds do not co-operate with the Shia Arabs who form 60 per cent of the population.
The main Shia opposition group is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), with 3-5,000 fighters, but it is tainted by Iranian support. Most Shia would like to have
a greater say in Iraqi government, but not necessarily control: they do no want secession, Islamic
autonomy or Iranian influence.

REGIONAL

16 Iraq’s neighbours have a direct interest in the country’s affairs. Iran and Turkey, in
particular, are wary of US influence and oppose some opposition groups. Turkey, conscious of
its own restive Kurdish minority, will do anything to prevent the establishment of a independent
Kurdish state in northern Iraq, including intervention. Iran, also with a Kurdish minority, would
also oppose a Kurdish state and is keen to protect the rights of its co-religionists in the south (see
FCO paper on P5, European and regional view of possible military action against Iraq, attached.)

17 We have looked at three options for achieving regime change (we dismissed assassination
of Saddam Hussein as an option because it would be illegal):

OPTION 1: COVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS

18 The aim would be to bring down the regime byinternal [sic] revolt, aided by the defection
or at least acquiescence of large sections of the Army. A group of Sunni generals probably from
within the Republican Guard, might depose Saddam if they decided the alternative was defeat.
This option could be pursued by providing covert intelligence, large scale financial and Special
Forces support to opposition groups. The Kurds would be persuaded to unite and attack into
northern Iraq, tying down some Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, in a greater threat to the regime, the
Shia would rise up in the southern cities, and in Baghdad.

19 This option also has a very low prospect of success on its own. The external opposition is
no strong enough to overthrow Saddam and would be rejected by most Iraqis as a replacement
government. The Kurds could only mount a very limited offensive in the north. Mass uprisings
in the south would be unlikely. The US failure to support the 1991 uprising remains vivid. The
Republican Guard would move against any opposition and any wavering regular Army units.
There would also be a high risk of US/coalition forces being captured. The remaining elements
of opposition could be eliminated, buttressing Saddam and his reputation as Arab folk hero. On
the other hand, this option has never been pursued in a concerted, single-minded way before and
should not be dismissed, at least as a possible precursor to Options 2 and 3.

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OPTION 2: AN AIR CAMPAIGN PROVIDING OVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION
GROUPS LEADING TO A COUP OR UPRISING

20 The aim would be to assist an internal revolt by providing strategic and tactical air
support for opposition groups to move against the regime. Such support would disable Saddam’s
military and security apparatus. Suspected WMD facilities would also be targeted. Substantial
numbers of aircraft and munitions would need to be built up in threatre over a period of months.
Any campaign would take several weeks at least probably several months. Pressure on the
regime could be increased by massing ground and naval forces and threatening a land invasion.

21 This option has no guarantee of success. The build up of pressure might persuade other
Sunnis to overthrow Saddam and his family, but there is no guarantee that another Sunni autocrat
would be better. Comparisons with Afghanistan are misleading. Saddam’s military and security
apparatus is considerable more potent and cohesive. We are not aware of any Karzai figure able
to command respect inside and outside Iraq. Arab states would only back the plan if they were
sure Saddam would be deposed. At least the co-operation of Kuwait would be needed for the
necessary military build-up. The Arab street would oppose an air attack against Iraq, but
visibility of a popular uprising could calm Arab public opinion.

OPTION 3: A GROUND CAMPAIGN

22 The aim would be to launch a full-scale ground offensive to destroy Saddam]s [sic]
military machine and remove him from power. A pro-Western regime would be installed which
would destroy Iraq’s WMD capability, make peace with Iraq’s neighbours and give rights to all
Iraqis, including ethnic minorities. As in the Gulf War, this would need to be preceded by a
major air-offensive to soften up defences.

23 US contingency planning prior to 11 September indicated that such a ground campaign

would require 200-400,000 troops. The numbers would be roughly half those of 1991 because
Iraqi forces are now considerably weaker. Any invasion force would need to pose a credible
threat to Baghdad in order to persuade members of the Sunni military elite that their survival was
better served by deserting to the coalition than staying loyal to Saddam. Sufficient air assets
would need three months and ground forces at least four-five months to assemble so on logistical
grounds a ground campaign is not feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to start action
are early spring.

24 From a purely military perspective it would be very difficult to launch an invasion from
Kuwait alone. Carrier-based aircraft would not be enough because of the need for land-based air-
to-air refuelling. T be confident of success, bases either in Jordan or in Saudi Arabia would be
required. However, a wider and durable international coalition would be advantageous for both
military and political reasons. Securing moderate Arab support would be greatly assisted by the
promise of a quick and decisive campaign, and credible action by the US to address the MEPP.

25 The risks include US and others military casualties. Any coalition would need much
tending over the difficult months of preparation for an actual invasion. Iran, fearing further US
encirclement and that it will be invaded next will be prickly but is likely to remain neutral. With

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his regime in danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an invasion. Saddam
could also target Israel as he did during the Gulf War. Restraining Israel will be difficult. it
would try to pre-empt a WMD attack and has certainly made clear that it would retaliate. Direct
Israeli military involvement in Iraq would great complicate coalition management and risk
spreading conflict more widely.

26 None of the above options is mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural
precursors to Option 3. All options had lead times. If an invasion is contemplated this autumn, then
a decision will need to be taken in principle six months in advance. The greater investment of
Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the greater the cost and the longer we
would need to stay. Option 3 comes closest to guaranteeing regime change. At this stage we need to
wait to see which option or combination of options may be favoured by the US government.

27 But it should be noted that even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD
and build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and Israel retain their WMD and
conventional armouries.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

28 A full opinion should be sought from the Law Officers if the above options are developed
further. But in summary CONTAINMENT generally involves the implementation of existing
UNSCRs and has a firm legal foundation. Of itself, REGIME CHANGE has no basis in
international law. A separate note by FCO Legal Advisors setting out the general legal
background and the obligations in the relevant UN Resolutions is attached.

29 In the judgement of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with
international terrorism. There is therefore no justification for action against Iraq based on action
in self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan. However,
Article 51 would come into play if Iraq were about to attack a neighbour.

30 Currently, offensive military action against Iraq can only be justified if Iraq is held to be
in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire resolution, 687. 687 imposed obligations on Iraq with regard
to the elimination of WMD and monitoring these obligations. But 687 never terminated the
authority to use force mandated in UNSCR 678 (1990). Thus a violation of 687 can revive the
[sic] authorisation to use force in 678.

31 As the ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687, it is for the Council to
decide whether a breach of obligations has occurred. There is a precedent, UNSCR 1205 (1998),
passed after the expulsion of the UN inspectors, stated that in doing so Iraq had acted in flagrant
violation of its obligations under 687. In our view, this revived the authority for the use of force
under 678 and underpin ned Operation Dessert Fox. In contrast to general legal opinion, the US
assets the right of individual Member States to determine whether Iraq has breached 687,
regardless of whether the Council has reached this assessment.

32 For the P5 and the majority of the Council to take the view that Iraq was in breach of
687:

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* they would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its obligations regarding WMD,
and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity.
Current intelligence is insufficiently robus [sic] to meet this criterion. Even with overriding proof
China, France and Russia, in particular, would need considerable lobbying to approve or
acquiesce ina new resolution authorising military action against Iraq. Concessions in other policy
areas might be needed. However, many Western states, at lest, would not wish to oppose the US
on such a major issue; or
* if P5 unity could be obtained, Iraq refused to readmit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by
the UN Security Council; or
* the UN inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence of WMD activity or
were again expelled trying to do so.

CONCLUSION

33 In sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of overridng force in a ground
campaign is the only option that we can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back
into the international community.

34 To launch such a campaign would require a staged approach:

* winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam through tougher containment.
Stricter implementation of sanctions and a military build-up will frighten his regime. A refusal to
admit N inspectors, or their admission and subsequent likely frustration, which resulted in an
appropriate finding by the Security Council could provide the justification for military action.
Saddam would try to prevent this, although he has miscalculated beofre [sic];
* careful planning: detailed military planning on the various invasion and basing options, and
when appropriate force deployment;
* coalition building: diplomatic work to establish an international coalition to provide the broadest
political and military support to a ground campaign. This will need to focus on China, France and
particularly Russia who have the ability to block action in the UN Security Council and on the
other Europeans. Special attention will need to be paid to moderate Arab states and to Iran;
* incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be made with regard to Iraqi territorial
integrity. Plans should be worked up in advance of the great benefits the international community
could provide for a post-Saddam Iraq and its people. These should be published.
* tackling other regional issues: an effort to engage the US in a serious effort to re-energise the
MEPP would greatly assist coalition building; and
*sensitising the public: a media campaign to warm of the dangers that Saddam poses and to
prepare public opinion both in the UK and abroad.

35 The US should be encouraged to consult widely on its plans.

OVERSEAS AND DEFENCE SECRETARIAT

CABINET OFFICE
8 MARCH

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

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Text of the Iraq: Legal Background-March 8, 2002 memo from UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (office of Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary) to Tony Blair advising him on
the legality of the use of force against Iraq.

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ: LEGAL BACKGROUND

(i) Use of Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions

(b) Self-defence
(c) Humanitarian Intervention

(ii) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the sanctions regime

(iv) Security Council Resolutions relating to UNMOVIC

(i) Use of Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions relevant to the Authorisation of the Use of
Force

1. Following its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, the Security Council authorised the use of
force against Iraq in resolution 675 (1990); this resolution authorised coalition forces to use all
necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw, and to restore international peace and security in the
area. This resolution gave a legal basis for Operation Desert Storm, which was brought to an end
by the cease-fire set out by the Council in resolution 687 (1991). The conditions for the cease-
fire in that resolution (and subsequent resolutions) imposed obligations on Iraq with regard to the
elimination of WMD and monitoring of its obligations. Resolution 687 (1991) suspended but did
not terminate the authority to use force in resolutions 678 (1990).

2. I the UK’s view a violation of Iraq’s obligations which undermines the basis of the cease-fire
in resolution 687 (1991) can revive the authorisation to use force in resolutions 678 (1990). As
the cease-fire was proclaimed by the Council in resolution 687 (1991), it is for the Council to
assess whether any such breach of those obligations has occurred. The US have a rather different
view: they maintain that the assessment if breach is for individual member States. We are not
aware of any other State which supports this view.

3. The authorisation to use force contained in resolution 678 (1990) has been revived in this way
on certain occasions. For example, when Iraq refused to cooperate with the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM) in 1997/8, a series of SCRs condemned the decision as unacceptable.
In resolution 1205 (1998) the Council condemned Iraq’s decision to end all cooperation with
UNSCOM as a flagrant violation of Iraq’s obligations under resolution 687 (1991), and restated
that the effective operation of UNSCOM was essential for the implementation of that Resolution.
In our view these resolutions had the effect of causing the authorisation to use force in
resolutions 678 (1991) to revive, which provided a legal basis for Operation Desert Fox. In a
letter to the President of the Security Council in 1998 we stated that the objective of that

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operation was to seek compliance by Iraq with the obligations laid down by the Council that
theoperation was undertaken only when it became apparent that there was no other way of
achieving compliance by Iraq, and that the action was limited to what was necessary to secure
this objective.
4. The more difficult issue is whether we are still able to rely on the same legal base for the use
of force more than three years after the adoption of resolution 1205 (1998). Military action in
1998 (and on previous occasions) followed on from specific decisions of the Council; there has
now not been any significant decision by the Council since 1998. Our interpretation of
resolutions 1205 was controversial anyway; many of our partners did not think the legal basis
was sufficient as the authority to use force was no explicit. Reliance on it now would be unlikely
to receive any support.

USE OF FORCE: (B) SELF-DEFENCE

5. The conditions that have to be met for the exercise of the right of self-defence are well known:
i) There must be an armed attach upon a State or such an attack must be imminent;
ii) The use of force must be necessary and other means to reverse/avert the attack must be
unavailable;
iii) The acts in self-defence must be proportionate and strictly confined to the object of stopping
the attack.

The right of self-defence may only be exercise until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to ensure international peace and security and anythign [sic] done in exercise fo [sic]
the right of self-defence must be immediately reported to the Council.

6. for the exercise of the right of self-defence there must be more than “a threat”. There has to be
an armed attack actual or imminent. The development of possession of nuclear weapons does not
in itself amount to an armed attack; what would be needed would be clear evidence of an
imminent attack. During the Cold War there was certainly a threat in the sense that various States
had nuclear weapons which they might, at short notice unleash upon each other. But that did not
mean the mere possession of nuclear weapons, or indeed their possession in time of high tension
or attempt to obtain them, was sufficient to justify pre-emptive action. And when Israel attacked
an Iraqi nuclear reaction, near Baghdad, on 7 June 1981 it was “strongly condemned” by the
Security Council (acting unanimously) as a “military” attack ....in clear violation of the Charter
of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct”.

USE OF FORCE: (C) HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

7. In the UK view the use of force may be justified if the action is taken to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. The limits to this highly contentious doctrine are not
clearly defined , but we would maintain the the catastrophe must be clear and well documented,
that there must be no other means short of the use of force which could prevent it, and that the
measures taken must be proportionate. this doctrine partly underlies the very limited action taken
by allied aircraft to patrol the No Fly Zones in Iraq (following action by Saddam to repress the
Kurds and the Shia in the early 90s), which involved occasional and limited use of force by those
aircraft in self-defence. The application os this doctrine depends on the circumstances at any
given time, but it is clearly exceptional.

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(II) NO FLY ZONES (NFZs)

8. The NFZs over Northern and Southern Iraq are not established by UN Security Council
Resolutions. They were established in 1991 and 1992 on the basis that they were necessary and
proportionate steps taken to prevent a huminitarian [sic] crisis. Prior to the establishment of the
Northern NFZ the Security Council had adopted resolution 688 (1991) on 5 April 1991 in which
the Council stated that it was gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population
in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which had led to a
massive refugee flow and that it was deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering
involved. The resolution condemned that repression of the Iraqi civilian population and
demanded that Iraq immediately end the repression. In our view the purpose of the NFZs is to
moniter [sic] Iraqi compliance with the provisions of resolution 688. UK and US air-craft
patrolling the NFZs are entitled to use force in self-defence where such a use of force [sic] is a
necessary and proportionate response to actual or imminent attack from Iraqi ground systems.

9. The US have on occasion claimed that the purpose of the NFZs is to enforce Iraqi compliance
with resolutions 687 or 688. This view is not consisent [sic] with resolution 687, which does not
deal with the repression of the Iraqi population, or with resolution 688, which was not adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and does not contain any provision for enforcement. Nor
(as it is sometimes claimed) were the current NFZs provided for in the Safwan agreement, a
provisional agreement between coalition and Iraqi commanders of 3 March 1991,laying down
military conditions for the cease fire which did not contain any reference to the NFZs.

(III) SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO THE SANCTIONS REGIME

10. The sanctions regime against Iraq was established by resolutions 661 (1990) of 8 August
1990, which, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, decides that all states shall prevent the
import into their territories of any commodities originating in Iraq, the sale or supply to Iraq of
any commodities other than medical supplies, and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs,
and that Iraqi funds and financial resources should be frozen. Resolution 661 remains in force.
The major exception to the sanctions regime is the oil for food programme which was
established by resolution 986 (1993) by Iraq on condition that the purchase price is paid into an
escrow account established by the UN Secretary-General, and the funds to that account are used
to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the export of medicine, health
supplies, foodstuffs and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. The escrow account is
also used to fund the Un [sic] Compensation Commission and to meet the operating costs of the
UN, includign [sic] those of UNMOVIC (see below).

11. The oil for food programme is renewed by the Security Council at (usually) 6 monthly
intervals, most recently by resolution 1382 (211) of 29 November 2001. Under that resolution
the Council also decided that it would adopt, by 13 May 2002, procedures which would improve
the flow of goods to Iraq, other than arms and other potential dual use goods on a Good Review
List. The US are currently reviewing the final details of the list with the Russians.

12. In resolution 687 (1991) the Council decided that the prohibition against the import of goods
from Iraq should have no further force when Iraq has completed all the actions contemplated in

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paragraphs 8-13 of that resolution concerning Iraq’s WMD programme. Iraq has still not
complied with this condition. Under paragraph 21 of resolution 687, the Council decided to
review the prohibition against the supply of commodities to Iraq every 60 days in the light of the
policies and practices of the Iraqi government, including the implementation of all the relevant
resolutions of the Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift them. These
regular reviews are currently suspended as a result of Iraqi noncompliance with the Council’s
demands.

13. The intention of the Council to act in accordance with resolution 687 on the termination of
these prohibitions has been regularly reaffirmed, including in resolution 1284 (1999). Paragraph
33 of that resolution also contains a complex formula for the suspension of economic sanctions
against Iraq for renewable periods of 120 days, if UNMOVIC and the IAEA report cooperation
in all respects by Iraq in fulfilling work programmed with those bodies for a period of 120 days
after a reinforced system of monitoring and verification in Iraq becomes fully operational. Iraq
has never complied with these conditions.

(iv) SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO UNMOVIC

14. UNMOVIC was established under resolution 687 (1991) (the ceasefire resolution).
UNMOVIC is to undertake the responsibilities of the former Special Commission under
resolution 687 relating to the destruction of Iraqi CBW and ballistic missiles with a range of over
150 kilometres and the on-going monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with these
obligations. Like the Special Commission, UNMOVIC is to be allowed unconditional access to
all Iraqi facilities, equipment and records as well as to Iraqi officials. Under pragraph [sic] 7 of
resolution 1284 UNMOVIC and the IAEA were given the responsibility of drawing up a work
programme which would include the implementation of a reinforced system of ongoing
monitoring and verification (OMV) and key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by
Iraq, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance. There are currently no
UNMOVIC personnel in Iraq, and the reinforced OMV system has not been implemented
because of IRaq’s [sic] refusal to cooperate.

- 12 -
Text of the David Manning Memo - March 14, 2002 memo from David Manning
(UK Foreign Policy Advisor) to Tony Blair recounting Manning’s meetings with his US
counterpart Condoleeza Rice (National Security Advisor), and advising Blair for his upcoming
visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch.

SECRET - STRICTLY PERSONAL

FROM : DAVID MANNING

DATE: 14 MARCH 2002

CC: JONATHAN POWELL

PRIME MINISTER

YOUR TRIP TO THE US

I had dinner with Condi on Tuesday; and talks and lunch with her an NSC team on Wednesday
(to which Christopher Meyer also came). These were good exchanges, and particularly frank
when we were one-on-one at dinner. I attach the records in case you want to glance.

IRAQ

We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and has
registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for regime
change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different
than anything in the States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we
pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was
not an option.

Condi’s enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. But there were some signs, since we last
spoke, of greater awareness of the practical difficulties and political risks. (See the attached piece
by Seymour Hersh which Christopher Meyer says gives a pretty accurate picture of the uncertain
state of the debate in Washington.)

From what she said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions:
- how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and
justified;
- what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition;
- how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition (assuming there is
any);
- what happens on the morning after?

Bush will want to pick your brains. He will also want to hear whether he can expect coalition
support. I told Condi that we realiised that the Administration could go it alone if it chose. But if
it wanted company, it would have to take account of the concerns of its potential coalition
partners. In particular:

- 13 -
- the Un [sic] dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled in a way that
would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was conscious of the international
framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need for a legal base. Renwed refused
[sic] by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument’
- the paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine. Unless we did, we could find ourselves
bombing Iraq and losing the Gulf.

YOUR VISIT TO THE RANCH

No doubt we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my talks with Condi convinced me that
Bush wants to hear you [sic] views on Iraq before taking decisions. He also wants your support.
He is still smarting from the comments by other European leaders on his Iraq policy.

This gives you real influence: on the public relations strategy; on the UN and weapons
inspections; and on US planning for any military campaign. This could be critically important. I
think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree
that failure isn’t an option, but this does not mean that they will avoid it.

Will the Sunni majority really respond to an uprising led by Kurds and Shias? Will Americans
really put in enough ground troops to do the job if the Kurdish/Shi’ite stratagem fails? Even if
they do will they be willing to take the sort of casualties that the Republican Guard may inflict
on them if it turns out to be an urban war, and Iraqi troops don’t conveniently collapse in a heap
as Richard Perle and others confidently predict? They need to answer there and other tough
questions, in a more convincing way than they have so far before concluding that they can do the
business.

The talks at the ranch will also give you the chance to push Bush on the Middle East. The Iraq
factor means that there may never be a better opportunity to get this Administration to give
sustained attention to reviving the MEPP.

- 14 -
Text of the Christopher Meyer Letter - March 18, 2002 memo from
Christopher Meyer (UK ambassador to the US) to David Manning (UK Foreign Policy Advisor)
recounting Meyer’s meeting with Paul Wolfowitz (US Deputy Secretary of Defense).

DAVID MANNING

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

British Embassy Washington

From the Ambassador

Christopher Meyer KCMG

18 March 2002

Sir David Manning KCMG

No 10 Downing Street

1. Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, came to Sunday lunch on 17 March.

2. On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used the Condi Rice last week.
We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option. It would
be a tough sell for us domestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go
it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for
building support for military action against Saddam. I then went through the need to wrongnfoot
Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs and the critical importance of the MEPP as an
integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skilfully (sic), we
were fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board.

3. I said that the UK was giving serious through to publishing a paper that would make the case
against Saddam. If the UK were to join with the US in any operation against Saddam, we would
have to be able to take a critical mass of parliamentary and public opinion with us. It was
extraordinary how people had forgotten ho bad he was.

4. Wolfowitz said that he fully agreed. He took a slightly different position from others in the
Administration, who were forcussed (sic) on Saddam’s capacity to develop weapons of mass
destruction. The WMD danger was of course crucial to the public ase against Saddam,
particularly the potential linkage to terrorism. But Wolfowitz thought it indispensable to spell out
in detail Saddam’s barbarism. This was well documented from what he had done during the
occupation of Kuwait, the incursion into Kurdish territory, the assault on the Marsh Arabs, and to
hiw (sic) own people. A lot of work had been done on this towards the end of the first Bush
administration. Wolfowitz thought that this would go a long way to destroying any notion of
moral equivalence between Iraq and Israel. I said that I had been forcefully struck, when
addressing university audiences in the US, how ready students were to gloss over Saddam’s
crimes and to blame the US and the UK for the suffering of the Iraqi people.

- 15 -
5. Wolfowitz said that it was absurd to deny the link between terrorism and Saddam. There might
be doubt about the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker on
9/11, and Iraqi intelligence (did we, he asked, know anything more about this meeting?). But
there were other substantiated cases of Saddam giving comfort to terrorists, including someone
involved in the first attack on the World Trade Center (the latest New Yorker apparently has a
story about links between Saddam and Al Qaeda operating in Kurdistan).

6. I asked to Wolfowitz’s take on the struggle inside the Administrations between the pro- and
anti- INC lobbies (well documented in Sy Hersh’s recent New Yorker piece, which I gave you).
He said that he found himself between the two sides (but as the conversation developed, it
became clear that Wolfowitz was far more pro-INC than not). He said that he was strongly
opposed to what some were advocating: a coalition including all outside the factions except the
INC (INA, KDP, PUK, SCRI) . This would not work. Hostility towards the INC was in reality
hostility toward Chalabi. It was true that Chalabi was not the easiest person to work with. Bute
(sic) had a good record in bringing high-grade defectors out of Iraq. The CIA stubbornly refused
to recognize this. They unreasonably denigrated the INC because of their fixation with Chalabi.
When I mentioned that the INC was penetraded (sic) by Iraqi intelligence, Wolfowitz
commented that this was probably the case with all the opposition groups: it was something we
would have to live with. As to the Kurds, it was true that they were living well (another point to
be made in any public dossier on Saddam) and that they feared provoking an incursion by
Baghdad. But there were good people among the Kurds, including in particular Salih (?) of the
PUK. Wolfowitz brushed over my reference to the absence of Sunni in the INC: there was a big
difference between Iraqi and Iranian Shia. The former just wanted to be rid of Saddam.

7. Wolfowitz was pretty dismissive of the desirability of a military coup and of the defector
generals in the wings. The latter had blood on their hands. The important thing was to try to have
Saddam replaced by something like a functioning democracy. Though imperfect, the Kurdish
model was not bad. How to achieve this, I asked? Only through a coalition of all the parties was
the answer (we did not get into military planning).

- 16 -
Text of the Peter Ricketts Letter - March 22, 2002 memo from Peter Ricketts
(Political Director, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Jack Straw (UK Foreign
Secretary) providing Ricketts’ advice for the Prime Minister on issues of the threat posed by
Iraq, connections to al Qaida, post-war considerations and working with the UN.

Confidential and Personal PR.121

From: P F Ricketts, Political Director

Date: 22 March 2002

CC: PUS

Secretary of State

IRAQ: Advice for the Prime Minister

1 You invited thoughts for your personal note to the Prime Minister covering the official
advice (we have put up a draft minute separately). Here are mine.

2 By sharing Bush's broad objective" the Prime Minister can help shape how it is defined, and
the approach to achieving it. In the process, he can bring home to Bush home of the realities
which will be less evident from Washington. He can help Bush make good decisions by telling
him things his own machine probably isn't.

3 By broad support for the objective brings two real problems which need discussing.

4 First, the THREAT. The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's
WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11 September. This is not something we need
to be defensive about, but attempts to claim otherwise publicly will increase scepticism about our
case. I am relieved that you decided to postpone publication of the unclassified document. My
meeting yesterday showed that there is more work to do to ensuer that the figures are accurate
and consistent with those of the US. But even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will
not show much advance in recent years ont he nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts: the
programmes are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know", been stepped up.

5 US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Aaida is so far frankly unconvincing.
To get public and Parliamentary support for military operations, we have to be convincing that:

- the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending our troops to die for;

- it is qualitatively different from the threat posed by other proliferators who are closer to
achieving nuclear capability (including Iran).

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

- 17 -
We can make the case on qualitative difference only Iraq has attacked a neighbour' used CW and
fired missiles against Israel). The overall strategy needs to include re-doubled efforts to tackle
other proliferators, including Iran, in other ways (the UK/French ideas on greater IAEA activity
are helpful here). But we are still left with a problem of bringing public opinion to accept the
imminence of a threat from Iraq. This is something the Prime Minister and President need to
have a frank discussion about.

6 The second problem is the END STATE. Military operations need clear and compelling
military objectives. For Kosovo" it was: Serba out, Kosovars back" peace-keepers in. For
Afghanistan, destroying the Taleban and Al Qaida military capability. For Iraq, "regime change:
does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam. Much better, as you have
suggested, to make the objective ending the threat to the international community from Iraqi
WMD before Saddam uses it or gives it to the terrorists. This is at once easier to justify in terms
of international law" but also more demanding. Regime change which produced another Sunni
General still in charge of an active Iraqi WMD programmme would be a bad outcome (not least
because it would be almost impossible to maintain UN sanctions on a new leader who came in
promising a fresh start). As with the fight against UBL, Bush would do well to de"personalise
the objective" focus on elimination of WMD, and show that he is serious about UN Inspectors as
the first choice means of achieving that (it is win/win for him: either Saddam against all the odds
allows Inspectors to operate freelyk" in which case we can further hobble his WMD
programmes, or he blocks/hinders, and we are on stronger ground for switching to other
methods),

7 Defining the end state in this way, and working through the UN, will of course also help
maintain a degree of support among the Europeans, and therefore fits with another major
message which the Prime Minister will watn to get across: the importance of positioning Iraq as
a problem for the inernational community as a whole" not just for the US.

PETER RICKETTS

- 18 -
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Text of the Jack Straw Memo - March 25, 2002 memo from Jack Straw (UK
Foreign Secretary) to Tony Blair in preparation for Blair’s visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch,
covering Iraq-al Qaida linkage, legality of invasion, weapons inspectors and post-war
considerations.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PM/02/019

CRAWFORD/IRAQ

1 The rewards from your visit to Crawford will be few. The risks are high, both for you and for
the Government. I judge that there is at present no majority inside the PLP for any military
action against Iraq, (alongside a greater readiness in the PLP to surface their concerns).
Colleagues know that Saddam and the Iraqi regime are bad. Making that case is easy. But we
have a long way to go to convince them as to:

(a) the scale of the threat from Iraq and why this has got worse recently:

(b) what distinguishes the Iraqi threat from that of eg Iran and North Korea so as to justify
military action;

(c) the justification for any military action in terms of international law: and

(d) whether the consequence of military action really would be a compliant, law abiding
replacement government.

2 The whole exercise is made much more difficult to handle as long as conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians is so acute.

THE SCALE OF THE THREAT

3 The Iraqi regime plainly poses a most serious threat to its neighbours, and therefore to
international security. However, in the documents so far presented it has been hard to glean
whether the threat from Iraq is so significantly differently from that of Iran and North Korea as
to justify military action (see below).

WHAT IS WORSE NOW?

4 If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering
military action against Iraq. In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with
UBL and Al Qaida. Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11
September. What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community

- 19 -
(especially that of the US), the world having witnesses on September 11 just what determined
evil people can these days perpetuate.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRAQ, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

5 By linking these countries together in this "axis of evil" speech, President Bush implied an
identity betwen them not only in terms of their threat, but also in terms of the action necessary to
deal with the threat, but also in terms of the action necessary to deal with the threat. A lot of
work will now need to be to delink the three, and to show why military action against Iraq is so
much more justified than against Iran and North Korea. The heart of this case" that Iraq poses a
unique and present danger - rests on the facts that it:

* invaded a neighbour;
* has used WMD and would use them again;
* is in breach of nine UNSCRS.

THE POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

6 That Iraq is in flagrant breach of international legal obligations imposed on it by the UNSC
provides us with the core of a strategy, and one which is based on international law. Indeed' if
the argument is to be won, the whol case against Iraq and in favour (if necessary) of military
action, needs to be narrated with reference to the international rule of law.

7 We also have better to sequence the explanation of what we are doing and why. Specifically,
we need to concentrate in the early stages on:

* making operational the sanctions regime foreshadowed by UNSCR 1382;

* demanding the readmission of weapons inspectors, but this time to operate in a free and
unfettered way (a similar formula to that which Cheney used at your joint press conference, as I
recall).

8 I know there are those who say that an attack on Iraq would be justified whether or not
weapons inspectors were readmitted. But I believe that a demand for the unfettered readmission
of weapons inspectors in essential, in terms of public explanation, and in terms of legal sanction
for any subsequent military action.

9 Legally there are two potential elephant traps:

(i) regime change per se is no justification for military action; it could form part of the method
of any strategy, but not a goal. Of course, we may want credibly to assert that regime change is
an essential part of the strategy by which we have to achieve our ends - that of the elimination of
Iraq's WMD capacity; but the latter has to be the goal;

(ii) on whether any military action would require a fresh UNSC mandate (Desert Fox did not).
The US are likely to oppose any idea of a fresh mandate. On the other side, the weight of legal

- 20 -
advice here is that a fresh mandate may well be required. There is no doubt that a new UNSCR
would transform the climate in the PLP. Whilst that (anew mandate) is very unlikely, given the
US's position, a draft resolution against military action with 13 in favour (or handsitting) and two
vetoes against could play very badly here.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY MILITARY ACTION

10 A legal justification is a necessary but far from sufficient pre"condition for military action.
We have also to answer the big question - what will this action achieve? There seems to be a
larger hole in this than on anything. Most of the assessments from the US have assumed regime
change as a means of eliminating Iraq's WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how
that regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement
regime will be better.

11 Iraq has had NO history of democracy so no-one has this habit or experience.

(JACK STRAW)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

25 March 2002

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 21 -
Text of the Cabinet Office Briefing Paper, July 21 2005
Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action
Submitted by downing on Sun, 2005-06-12 12:12. Evidence

Published by Sunday Times of London, June 12, 2005

The paper, produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002, is incomplete because the last page
is missing. The following is a transcript rather than the original document in order to protect the
source.

PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES ONLY

IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION (A Note by Officials)

Summary

Ministers are invited to:

(1) Note the latest position on US military planning and timescales for possible action.

(2) Agree that the objective of any military action should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within
present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its
neighbours or international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

(3) Agree to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a realistic political strategy,
which includes identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein and creating the conditions
necessary to justify government military action, which might include an ultimatum for the return
of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime Minister to
President Bush ahead of the briefing of US military plans to the President on 4 August.

(4) Note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed Forces to undertake
operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the MOD should bring forward proposals for the
procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements under cover of the lessons learned from
Afghanistan and the outcome of SR2002.

(5) Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office
Chairmanship to consider the development of an information campaign to be agreed with the US.

Introduction

1. The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as
yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the
political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it.

- 22 -
2. When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said that
the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain
conditions were met: efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the
Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through
the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted.

3. We need now to reinforce this message and to encourage the US Government to place its
military planning within a political framework, partly to forestall the risk that military action is
precipitated in an unplanned way by, for example, an incident in the No Fly Zones. This is
particularly important for the UK because it is necessary to create the conditions in which we
could legally support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will commit
themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support.

4. In order to fulfil the conditions set out by the Prime Minister for UK support for military
action against Iraq, certain preparations need to be made, and other considerations taken into
account. This note sets them out in a form which can be adapted for use with the US
Government. Depending on US intentions, a decision in principle may be needed soon on
whether and in what form the UK takes part in military action.

The Goal

5. Our objective should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating
with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international
security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD. It seems unlikely that this could
be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. US military planning
unambiguously takes as its objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by
elimination if Iraqi WMD. It is however, by no means certain, in the view of UK officials, that
one would necessarily follow from the other. Even if regime change is a necessary condition for
controlling Iraqi WMD, it is certainly not a sufficient one.

US Military Planning

6. Although no political decisions have been taken, US military planners have drafted options for
the US Government to undertake an invasion of Iraq. In a 'Running Start', military action could
begin as early as November of this year, with no overt military build-up. Air strikes and support
for opposition groups in Iraq would lead initially to small-scale land operations, with further land
forces deploying sequentially, ultimately overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the collapse
of the Iraqi regime. A 'Generated Start' would involve a longer build-up before any military
action were taken, as early as January 2003. US military plans include no specifics on the
strategic context either before or after the campaign. Currently the preference appears to be for
the 'Running Start'. CDS will be ready to brief Ministers in more detail.

7. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. This
means that legal base issues would arise virtually whatever option Ministers choose with regard
to UK participation.

- 23 -
The Viability of the Plans

8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the viability of US military plans. Their initial view is that
there are a number of questions which would have to be answered before they could assess
whether the plans are sound. Notably these include the realism of the 'Running Start', the extent
to which the plans are proof against Iraqi counter-attack using chemical or biological weapons
and the robustness of US assumptions about the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to fight.

UK Military Contribution

9. The UK's ability to contribute forces depends on the details of the US military planning and
the time available to prepare and deploy them. The MOD is examining how the UK might
contribute to US-led action. The options range from deployment of a Division (ie Gulf War sized
contribution plus naval and air forces) to making available bases. It is already clear that the UK
could not generate a Division in time for an operation in January 2003, unless publicly visible
decisions were taken very soon. Maritime and air forces could be deployed in time, provided
adequate basing arrangements could be made. The lead times involved in preparing for UK
military involvement include the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements, for which
there is no financial provision.

The Conditions Necessary for Military Action

10. Aside from the existence of a viable military plan we consider the following conditions
necessary for military action and UK participation: justification/legal base; an international
coalition; a quiescent Israel/Palestine; a positive risk/benefit assessment; and the preparation of
domestic opinion.

Justification

11. US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community.
Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law. But
regime change could result from action that is otherwise lawful. We would regard the use of
force against Iraq, or any other state, as lawful if exercised in the right of individual or collective
self-defence, if carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, or authorised by
the UN Security Council. A detailed consideration of the legal issues, prepared earlier this year,
is at Annex A. The legal position would depend on the precise circumstances at the time. Legal
bases for an invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable in both the first two instances but
would be difficult to establish because of, for example, the tests of immediacy and
proportionality. Further legal advice would be needed on this point.

12. This leaves the route under the UNSC resolutions on weapons inspectors. Kofi Annan has
held three rounds of meetings with Iraq in an attempt to persuade them to admit the UN weapons
inspectors. These have made no substantive progress; the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating.
Annan has downgraded the dialogue but more pointless talks are possible. We need to persuade
the UN and the international community that this situation cannot be allowed to continue ad
infinitum. We need to set a deadline, leading to an ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain

- 24 -
backing of a UNSCR for any ultimatum and early work would be necessary to explore with Kofi
Annan and the Russians, in particular, the scope for achieving this.

13. In practice, facing pressure of military action, Saddam is likely to admit weapons inspectors
as a means of forestalling it. But once admitted, he would not allow them to operate freely.
UNMOVIC (the successor to UNSCOM) will take at least six months after entering Iraq to
establish the monitoring and verification system under Resolution 1284 necessary to assess
whether Iraq is meeting its obligations. Hence, even if UN inspectors gained access today, by
January 2003 they would at best only just be completing setting up. It is possible that they will
encounter Iraqi obstruction during this period, but this more likely when they are fully
operational.

14. It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject
(because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which would not be regarded as
unreasonable by the international community. However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we
would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for military action by January 2003.

An International Coalition

15. An international coalition is necessary to provide a military platform and desirable for
political purposes.

16. US military planning assumes that the US would be allowed to use bases in Kuwait (air and
ground forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our
bases in Cyprus). The plans assume that Saudi Arabia would withhold co-operation except
granting military over-flights. On the assumption that military action would involve operations in
the Kurdish area in the North of Iraq, the use of bases in Turkey would also be necessary.

17. In the absence of UN authorisation, there will be problems in securing the support of NATO
and EU partners. Australia would be likely to participate on the same basis as the UK. France
might be prepared to take part if she saw military action as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking
to improve their US relations, might set aside their misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to
their legal and economic concerns. Probably the best we could expect from the region would be
neutrality. The US is likely to restrain Israel from taking part in military action. In practice, much
of the international community would find it difficult to stand in the way of the determined
course of the US hegemon. However, the greater the international support, the greater the
prospects of success.

A Quiescent Israel-Palestine

18. The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank has dampened Palestinian violence for the time
being but is unsustainable in the long-term and stoking more trouble for the future. The Bush
speech was at best a half step forward. We are using the Palestinian reform agenda to make
progress, including a resumption of political negotiations. The Americans are talking of a
ministerial conference in November or later. Real progress towards a viable Palestinian state is
the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab antipathy to military action

- 25 -
against Saddam Hussein. However, another upsurge of Palestinian/Israeli violence is highly
likely. The co-incidence of such an upsurge with the preparations for military action against Iraq
cannot be ruled out. Indeed Saddam would use continuing violence in the Occupied Territories to
bolster popular Arab support for his regime.

Benefits/Risks

19. Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the
benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular, we need to be sure that the outcome of the
military action would match our objective as set out in paragraph 5 above. A post-war
occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already
made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us
to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely
the means by which the desired endstate would be created, in particular what form of
Government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within which it would be
possible to identify a successor. We must also consider in greater detail the impact of military
action on other UK interests in the region.

Domestic Opinion

20. Time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take military
action against Saddam Hussein. There would also need to be a substantial effort to secure the
support of Parliament. An information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related
to an overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World
and the wider international community. This will need to give full coverage to the threat posed
by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and the legal justification for action.

Timescales

21. Although the US military could act against Iraq as soon as November, we judge that a
military campaign is unlikely to start until January 2003, if only because of the time it will take
to reach consensus in Washington. That said, we judge that for climactic reasons, military action
would need to start by January 2003, unless action were deferred until the following autumn.

22. As this paper makes clear, even this timescale would present problems. This means that:

(a) We need to influence US consideration of the military plans before President Bush is briefed
on 4 August, through contacts betweens the Prime Minister and the President and at other levels;

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Downing Street Minutes complete text
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607_1,00.html

The Sunday Times – Britain May 01, 2000

The secret Downing Street ‘memo’

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett,
Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown
only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough
and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military
action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not
convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to
line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam
among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military
action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action,
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for
publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August
and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

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(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then
a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days
deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by
an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A
hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical
for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main
options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern
Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on
the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for
military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear
that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided.
But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was
less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to
Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal
justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military
action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC
authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205
of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam
refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it
was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with
Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two
key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to
give the military plan the space to work.

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On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military
were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did
not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on
Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced
that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political
strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly
the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the
threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he
would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going
down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political
context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But
we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should
tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in
preparation for this operation.

c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and
possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors,
and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region
especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

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(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

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